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Aesthetic Reference 
 
 
David Boersema 
Pacific University 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
There are interpretive, pragmatic, and axiological aspects that are inherent and 
ineliminable in artistic representation and reference. Recognizing this, and 
acknowledging that these aspects apply to linguistic reference, as well, might be fruitful 
for philosophers of language to pursue in their analysis of linguistic reference.  
 
 
 
I would like to begin with a few disclaimers. First, this paper is primarily exploratory, 
rather than explanatory. That is, my goal is to suggest what I hope and believe are some 
fruitful connections between concerns in the philosophy of art and in the philosophy of 
language with respect to the issue of reference. As a result, in this paper I will less be 
arguing for a particular thesis and will more be pondering the nature and worth of certain 
questions and approaches to understanding reference. My second disclaimer is that, given 
my somewhat peripatetic goal, I will not be drawing upon, or even really commenting on, 
the latest thoughts of those who are considered to be today’s “big guns” on the issue of 
reference: David Kaplan, Scott Soames, Jeff King, etc. Instead, I will audaciously offer 
some remarks on reference and referring from the perspective of an outsider. I hope this 
exercise in audacity will prove to be splendid and not ridiculous. 
 The sorts of questions I will be asking are: Can work in the philosophy of art help 
to elucidate issues about reference (and, if so, how)? Does or can asking the question, 
“How does a picture refer?” or  “How does a musical phrase refer?” shed any light on 
“How does a word or name refer?” That is, how, if at all, can non-linguistic reference 
shed any light on linguistic reference? In addition, how does or can one refer with a work 
of art (or some aspect of an artwork); how can or does one refer in a work of art? Can a 
work of art (or some aspect of an artwork) mis-refer (and, if so, how)? Likewise, can an 
artist mis-refer? 
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1. ART 
I will begin with a particular example of a work of art. The example involves a statue – 
actually, a proposed statue – that was commissioned to honor the New York City 
firefighters following the events of 9/11. During the events of that day, a photojournalist, 
Tom Franklin, took a photograph (Figure 1 below) of three firefighters raising a flag at 
Ground Zero.  
 
 
Figure 1.   
Franklin, T.  (2001). “Ground Zero Spirit.”  The Record (Bergen County, NJ).  © 2001 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. 
 
The three firefighters were Dan McWilliams, George Johnson, and Billy Eisengrein; all 
three were white males. After seeing this photograph, Bruce Ratner, president of a New 
York City real estate management company, wanted to memorialize the heroism and 
meaning of that day by commissioning an honorific bronze statue. Ratner consulted with 
various fire department officials and with Ivan Schwartz (president of StudioEIS, in 
Brooklyn). Collectively they decided to pay homage to the firefighters and rescue 
workers of the day and decided to “employ artistic license” and create a commemorative 
statue that depicted three generic firefighters, one with what were believed to be 
characteristically white facial features, one with black facial features, and one with 
Hispanic facial features. A clay model of the statue (Figure 2 next page) was unveiled in 
December 2001 and was met with immediate criticism.  
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Figure 2.   
Statue © 2001 StudioEIS (Brooklyn, NY).   
 
Some people claimed that this was an act of political correctness. The photograph, they 
said, was of a real event and the proposed statue was a betrayal of and insult to the three 
individuals who were originally photographed. Those who defended the proposed statue 
claimed that the statue was not meant to be a three-dimensional photograph; it was meant 
to be a symbolic statement honoring not only the three specific firefighters, but also all 
those who engaged in the acts of heroism that day. Yet others claimed that it wasn’t even 
only about acts of heroism that day, but rather about honoring heroism generally or 
sacrifice or the American spirit. (Because of the uproar, the full statue – as opposed to the 
clay model that was unveiled – was never made.) 
What does this case have to do with reference? Beginning with the initial 
photograph, it seems obvious that many people took that photograph to be about three 
particular individuals. It seems quite reasonable to say that these people took the 
photograph to pictorially refer to those three particular individuals. If this is so, two 
questions immediately arise: first, how did this photograph refer, and, second, in virtue of 
what did it refer? By asking “how did this photograph refer” I mean what is it about the 
photograph that referred to those individuals? By asking “in virtue of what did the 
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photograph refer” I mean what is it in the photograph that referred to those individuals? 
 So: how did the photograph refer to those individuals? One way of answering this 
question is to say that the photograph represents those individuals. It represents them via 
depicting them. Of course, not all representations are depictions. (Indeed, many 
philosophers of art have noted this connection between representation and depiction and 
have written volumes on the nature of their interconnections.) For example, as Catherine 
Elgin has pointed out, a Monday-morning quarterback can use a coffee mug or a salt 
shaker to represent the players of a team while recounting some noteworthy play from 
yesterday’s big game. However, a coffee mug does not depict a football player. So, we 
might want to claim that the photograph refers to those three individuals because it 
depicts them.  
However, as opposed to the coffee mugs or salt shakers, we want to say that the 
photograph depicts them because there is a resemblance between the images on the 
photograph and the individuals depicted; it looks like them! This leads to another way of 
stating an answer and that is to say that the photograph involved an indexical 
signification. That is, following the terminology of Charles Peirce, an index is a sign that 
represents via a causal connection between the signifier and the object signified. For 
instance, a scar is a sign of a wound not because a scar looks like a wound, but rather 
because there is a direct causal relation between them. Likewise, smoke is a sign of fire 
and a weather vane is a sign of wind direction. Because a photograph results from a 
physical, causal process, this photograph refers to those particular individuals via a causal 
connection. The images on the photograph look like those individuals – and, hence, refer 
to them – because of a causal connection to them. Back to our question, then: how did 
this photograph refer to those individuals (assuming that it did refer)? Well, it depicted 
them and did so via a causal chain. Of course, at the phenomenological level, it was the 
aspect of looking like them that mattered to those who saw special value and merit in the 
photograph as opposed to the clay model statue. 
Regardless of what it was about the photograph that referred (that is, whether is 
was via images looking like their subjects or being causally connected to them), there is 
the related question of what was it in the photograph that referred? Was it a collection 
and configuration of pixels that constituted the reference (or, for that matter, that 
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constituted the depiction)? We are tempted to ask – at least, I am tempted to ask – what 
else could it have been? Had this been a dance rather than a photograph, the reference (or, 
at least representation) would have been via a collection and configuration of movements 
rather than pixels; had it been a musical composition, the reference (or, at least 
representation) would have been via a collection and configuration of sounds. We will 
come back to this issue later. 
First, some more remarks on depiction and reference. In spite of the numerous 
cases of people claiming to see the Virgin Mary in pizza slices, grilled cheese 
sandwiches, oil slicks, and even on potatoes, depiction cannot, in itself, be sufficient for 
reference. As Hilary Putnam noted, if an ant crawling across the sand traced out a 
particular pattern that we was a recognizable caricature of Winston Churchill (or, 
perhaps, a pattern of lines that appeared as the graphemes for the name “Winston 
Churchill”), we would not take such a depiction as referring to Churchill. Nor, for 
Putnam, is the missing element that of intention. As he remarked, to have the intention 
that anything should represent Churchill, a subject must be able to think about Churchill. 
Lines in the sand, noises, etc. cannot in themselves represent or refer. So, just as 
depiction is not sufficient for reference to occur, so, too, depiction is not necessary for 
reference to occur. Nonetheless, as is seen by the sensitivity concerning the firefighter 
photograph, there is pictorial reference and depiction is how this is accomplished. We 
will return to this point later. 
Now, with respect to the clay model, to what, if anything, did it refer? For its 
critics, it did not refer to the three individuals. (Minimally, it did not refer only to those 
three particular individuals.) For its supporters, what it referred to varied. That is, for 
some supporters it referred to those three individuals along with other individuals (i.e., to 
all of the 9/11 rescue workers), while to other supporters it referred to something more 
abstract, such as heroes or acts of heroism or the American spirit or… Assuming 
something was referred to, what was it about and within the clay model that referred? 
Well, like the photograph, the clay model was a representation. What, exactly, it 
represented is not a simple, single thing. It represented many and various things to 
different people. In addition, it depicted, though unlike the photograph, it did so three-
dimensionally and did so via a collection and configuration of globs of clay rather than of 
 6 
pixels. (One might ask: did the clay model refer to anything or did it “merely” depict or 
represent something? I will speak to this more directly later.) 
One thing that is true is that there was a causal connection between the clay model 
and the particular individuals who were photographed. The artist likened the clay model 
to the images in the photograph, although not in a complete one-to-one correspondence. 
The relevant difference was that the faces in the clay model were relevantly unlike the 
faces in the photograph. For critics of the clay model, the fact that the clay faces did not 
“look like” the faces in the photograph mattered, even though there was a causal 
connection between them.  
As an aside – though, I hope not an irrelevant aside – I offer a few hypothetical 
questions, “hypothetical” because I do not have a clear or strong sense of a good answer 
to them. The first question is: What would have been the response if the artist had made 
the faces in the clay model look like the faces in the photograph, but insisted that the clay 
model was not about those individuals, but was instead about all the day’s rescue workers 
or about acts of heroism, etc.; the fact that the faces in the clay model looked like those in 
the photograph was incidental, merely a matter of being lazy and not really caring what 
the faces looked like. In this case, would the response have still been outrage or – because 
the clay faces looked like the photographed faces – would the response have been that the 
clay model really referred to those particular individuals anyway? The second 
hypothetical question is: What would the response have been if, instead of creating a clay 
model, the artist had manipulated the photograph so that it was not simply a mirror-like 
duplication of the faces of those three individuals? That is, what if the artist had photo-
shopped the photograph so that, say, the faces were out of focus or were dimmed in some 
way or other or were given moustaches? As with the first hypothetical question, I am not 
sure what the answer, or a good answer, would be. I speculate that depending upon the 
nature and extent of the photo manipulation, there would be more or less acceptance of 
alterations of the photograph. This is important, I think, because this speaks to the fact 
that for most people it is less the causal story here and more the resemblance or similarity 
between the depictions and the individuals (that is, between the signifiers and the 
signifieds) that matters. Indeed, this is important because, I think, it speaks to the issue of 
the criteria for relevant likeness as a major concern in this case. At least some critics of 
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the clay model based their criticisms of it on the fact that the clay faces did not look 
enough like the photographed faces. However, some alterations might have been not only 
acceptable, but also welcomed or even desirable (e.g., perhaps wisps of smoke or soot 
that blocked part of their faces could have been deleted). Finally, what if the artist had 
made a clay model that did have faces that looked exactly like the photographed faces but 
insisted that the point was not to honor these individuals, but instead to criticize them for 
spending time raising a flag rather than seeing if there was yet anyone else they could 
have rescued from some building? So, rather than a work of art that was honoring 
heroism, the work of art was a criticism of patriotic grandstanding and the artist wanted 
to be sure to capture the faces accurately of those three individuals. 
Although these are hypothetical questions, I believe they speak to – and, I hope, 
help shed some light on – matters about the philosophy of art and also to matters about 
reference. For now, what I glean from this case is that there is non-linguistic reference. In 
addition, non-linguistic reference – in this case, pictorial – is a common aspect of works 
of art. What is referred to in a work of art and how a work of art refers involve inherent 
and ineliminable interpretive elements. Collections and configurations of pixels, paint 
strokes, globs of clay, musical notes, bodily movements, etc. can and do depict and 
represent and signify, but they do so not simply because they are such collections and 
configurations. Signification is a relation, not merely a dyadic one between a signifier 
and a signified, but a triadic one, requiring some recipient or interpretant. To put it 
schematically: some sign S signifies some content (perhaps an object) C to some 
interpretant I. A particular collection and configuration of pixels or clay globs signified 
one thing to certain people and another thing to other people. In the context of art, we 
take this phenomenon to be quite non-controversial, perhaps even expected. A given 
photograph or statue or dance or song means something (perhaps multiple things) to one 
person and something quite different to another. Likewise, just what various elements 
within a photograph or statue or dance or song depict and/or refer to can and do vary 
across audiences. A lilting piccolo can signify a small bird or even innocence; a set of 
bass notes played in a particular tempo can signify danger, with those notes being 
quarter-notes (as opposed to half- or full-notes) signifying increasing and more imminent 
danger, but they do not necessarily signify this (and do so only relationally). On the other 
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hand, this is not to say that what is thus signified is merely a matter of (subjective) 
interpretation. Those same notes played in the same way, say, as part of a wedding 
procession would be perplexing or perhaps humorous, but they would not be celebratory. 
Likewise, Shakespeare’s Hamlet might be open to multiple interpretations, but whatever 
it is about (or signifies or refers to), it is not about snowboarding. Nor is Ophelia 
representative of the present king of France or, for that matter, the present queen of 
England. Again, the point of these remarks will, I hope, be clear below. 
 
2. HISTORY 
In getting to the point of them, I will make a detour through another particular case. This 
time the case is not artistic, but historical. It involves the history of the naming of the 
planet Neptune. How did Neptune come to be named? In answering this question, it is 
instructive to first look at how the planet Uranus was named. In March 1781, William 
Herschel spotted what he noted as “a curious either nebulous star or perhaps a comet.” 
Within a few days he found that this “fuzzy object” had moved and, so, he identified it as 
a comet. Further observation revealed no tail or cloudlike coma, leading Nevil 
Maskelyne, from the Royal Greenwich Observatory, to suspect this might actually be a 
planet (a remarkable find, if true, as it would be the first “new” planet known since 
recorded human history). By November 1781 astronomers around the world had become 
convinced that Herschel’s find was indeed a planet and not a comet. (Herschel was not 
the first to take note of this “fuzzy object;” in 1690, John Flamsteed made mention of it 
and even assigned it a designation, “34 Tauri”, thinking it was a star.) 
 When it came to assigning a name to this newly discovered planet, a number of 
suggestions were made. The French astronomer, Joseph-Jérome Lalande suggested that it 
be named after Herschel himself. The German astronomer, Georg Lichtenberg, argued for 
the name “Astrea,” after the Greek goddess of justice. The Swedish astronomer, Erik 
Prosperin, recommended the name “Neptune” (!), honoring the brother of Jupiter and son 
of Saturn. Other suggestions were “Cybele” (wife of Saturn), “Hypercronius” (being 
above Saturn), “Minerva” (Roman goddess of wisdom), “Oceanus”  (a mythical river said 
to surround the Earth), even “Neptune of George III” and “Neptune of Great Britain”. 
Herschel weighed in with the proposal “Georgium Sidus” (“the Georgian star”). Finally, 
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Johann Elert Bode, who published the Astronomical Yearbook, an annual publication of 
astronomical tables, proposed the name “Uranus” (father of Saturn and grandfather of 
Jupiter). Abbé Maximilian Hell, director of the Vienna Observatory, commended this 
choice and immediately included it in his published astronomical tables. While the newly 
discovered planet was for a short time referred to as “Georgian” in England and as 
“Herschel” in France, the name “Uranus” quickly became widespread and eventually was 
the only name used. 
 Within several decades of the identification of Uranus as a planet, peculiarities in 
its orbit led astronomers to postulate the existence of an even more distant planet. 
Nationalistic competition, especially between French and British astronomers, resulted in 
a race to observationally discover this presumed planet. On the French side were François 
Arago and Urbain Jean-Joseph Le Verrier, while on the British side were George Biddell 
Airy, John Couch Adams, and James Challis. Armed with Newtonian theory and detailed 
astronomical tables, astronomers made specific predictions of where this new planet 
should be observed. Based on measured calculations of where the planet should be, it was 
finally Johann Gottfried Galle, of the Berlin Observatory, who made the initial sighting 
that was affirmed by other astronomers, in September 1846. 
 As in the case of Uranus, multiple names were proffered for this newly discovered 
planet. Galle at first suggested “Janus”, saying that the double face would be appropriate 
for this planet’s position on the frontier of the solar system. In a letter only a week later, 
Le Verrier stated to Galle that the French Bureau of Longitudes had decided upon the 
name “Neptune” (and, indeed, rejected “Janus” because it implied that there were no 
further undiscovered planets in the solar system). Within a few days, however, Le Verrier 
retracted the suggestion of “Neptune” and declared that the planet should be named after 
himself. Arago, claiming that Le Verrier was the actual discoverer of this planet (with 
Galle’s sighting being but the confirmation of that discovery) and claiming that Le 
Verrier had delegated the task and choice of dubbing the planet, announced that he would 
indeed name it after Le Verrier. (Arago then went on to announce that he also refused to 
refer to Uranus by any other name than “Hershcel”.) While among the French the 
appellation “Le Verrier’s Planet” became commonplace, in Britain “Neptune” had taken 
hold. As could be expected, other names were proposed. Challis suggested “Oceanus” 
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and this was endorsed, though somewhat mildly, by Airy. This was followed by a 
plethora of proposals: “Chronos”, “Hyperion”, “Atlas”, “Atreus”, “Gravia”, “Minerva”. 
(Rejecting the suggestion that this planet should be named after Le Verrier, British 
Admiral W. H. Smyth wrote to Airy: “Mythology is neutral ground. Herschel is a good 
enough name. Le Verrier somehow or other suggests a Fabriquant and is therefore not so 
good. But just think how awkward it would be if the next planet should be discovered by 
a German, by a Bugge, a Funk, or your hirsute friend Boguslawski?”) As with Uranus, 
very quickly, except for pockets of opposition in France, “Neptune” was accepted as the 
name. 
 So, what is the point of this case with respect to the issue of reference? For me, 
the point is that this case gestures toward how reference is possible (or successful) and 
the sorts of non-semantic aspects that underlie reference. As the cases of Uranus and 
Neptune show, assignation (that is, the assigning of a name and the establishment of 
reference) can indeed be fairly complex. Neither Herschel, the “discoverer” of Uranus, 
nor Galle, the first to “observe” Neptune, had their respective dubbings accepted. Uranus 
is not named “Georgium Sidus” and Neptune is not named “Janus,” even though they 
were so dubbed by their respective “discoverers.” Furthermore, I think, this case shows 
that referring is not merely a matter of denoting or describing and that reference is not 
captured simply by analyzing the semantic aspects of sentences. Rather, I want to 
suggest, referring is also a matter of conferring and deferring and inferring. It is a matter 
of conferring in the sense that there is an inherent sociality to referring. It is not, and 
cannot be, a private act. (Cases in which it seems to be private, such as someone deciding 
to refer to something by a particular expression, say naming a newborn kitten, rest on and 
presuppose background publicity and social aspects of language, both in terms of 
semantics and pragmatics.) For much the same reasons, referring is a matter of deferring, 
that is, deferring to subsequent public usage. In many cases of referring (even with 
names) we very much explicitly defer to recognized authorities for the establishment of 
reference and names and for successful reference. Also, referring is inferring in the sense 
of requiring interpretation. Successful reference requires not only present, but also future 
reception, recognition, and understanding. 
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3. LESSONS 
These inherent aspects of reference – and especially to the activity of referring – are 
evident, I think, in the Neptune case, but even more so in the earlier case of pictorial 
reference. What it is to refer non-linguistically, I believe, clearly illustrates the 
conferring, deferring, and inferring aspects of reference. On the one hand, what exactly is 
referred to by a photograph (or other work of art) as well as in a photograph is not simply 
given. In large part, I want to say, it is negotiated. It is a matter of interpretation and 
understanding. What certain collections and configurations of pixels (or globs of clay or 
notes, etc.) refer to is in part dependent upon what is “out there” in the world, but also in 
part upon how we interpret and understand those collections and configurations. To once 
again appeal to Catherine Elgin, reference is not secured simply by having words uttered 
or written. Whether to say that a person refers depends on how his words are interpreted. 
If we can make no sense of a person’s utterances we put them down to incoherent 
ramblings. If their interpretation is straightforward, we take them to be meaningful and 
the terms in them to refer. But it is the availability of a reasonable interpretation that is 
crucial. What is true of words is even more evident of non-linguistic cases of reference. 
What a picture refers to, what a musical phrase refers to, what a dramatic scene refers to, 
are a function of, as noted above, interpretation and understanding. My claim is that this 
is true of linguistic reference, as well. However, at this point, I have not provided a 
thorough argument to this effect, but rather have made gestures toward such a conclusion. 
 As I stated at the start of my remarks, this paper is more exploratory than 
explanatory (a point which, no doubt, is painfully obvious!). The main gist of the 
exploration is to see if there is anything in the work of the philosophy of art that might 
shed some light on the issue of reference. I have begun the exploration by briefly 
considering a particular case of art (the 9/11 photograph and clay model statue) and 
related what I take to be some lessons from that case to lessons from the historical case of 
the naming of Neptune. At this point, having suggested what I hope are some fruitful 
connections between artistic reference and linguistic reference, I want to make a few 
more gestures toward how paying attention to philosophy of art might be helpful to 
philosophers of language. I will do this by briefly noting three areas of concern in the 
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philosophy of art that I think relate to concerns about reference. These areas are: (1) 
artist-centered concerns, (2) audience-centered concerns, and (3) critic-centered concerns. 
 Before turning to artist-centered concerns, I want to first note a basic issue that I 
think is relevant is the issue of seeing art as a process or a product. The relevance is 
whether, and in what ways, it is fruitful to see reference as a process or a product. That is, 
is the process and activity of referring a more fruitful approach than taking the “product” 
(i.e., reference) as the starting point. My own inclination is, following the work of John 
Dewey and others, to take referring as more basic than reference. However, for the 
present purposes, I am not going to pursue this.  
First, then, artist-centered concerns. These concerns are ones with respect to art 
that are generated by, or are particularly relevant to, the creator of a work of art. They 
include, for example, the phenomena of expression, communication, and provocation, as 
well as representation. That is, what is an artist doing via creating a work of art? For 
instance, what was Picasso doing in and with his painting, Guernica or Brahms in and 
with his Fifth Symphony? Assuming that something or other is represented in these 
works, there are issues of what was represented, how it was represented, and why it was 
represented. Again, what was Picasso doing? He was representing a particular historical 
event, but was representing much more than merely that event. Indeed, in representing 
that particular event, he necessarily focused on certain aspects of it and not on others. 
Likewise, he expressed or communicated or attempted to evoke (or provoke) by means of 
certain colors, textures, shapes, etc. As with what he represented, how he represented was 
a matter of selectivity on his part. In addition, there are issues of why he represented what 
he represented and why he did it in the way(s) that he did (e.g., why he chose black and 
white and gray vs. a rainbow of colors). To truly understand what this phenomenon is 
(i.e., the object Guernica as well as the phenomenon that is the creation of the object 
Guernica), all of these issues involving representation – that is, what, how, and why – are 
pertinent. If these are all relevant to matters of artistic representation and can be extended 
to pictorial reference (or, say, in the case of Brahms, auditory reference), then these might 
also be relevant and fruitful avenues of concern in grasping linguistic reference. 
A second focus is the audience-centered concerns. These concerns are not so 
much about the creation of a work of art, but rather about the nature of aesthetic 
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experience. What is it to encounter a work of art? What makes an experience an aesthetic 
one? These concerns, although different than those that are artist-centered, still involve 
representation. In “receiving” art, we still take art to be about something or other (even if, 
as is rarely the case, it is only about someone expressing herself). The issues here also 
revolve around questions of what, how, and why, but in this context they are more related 
to what is experienced in an aesthetic experience, how it is experienced, and why it is 
experienced. For instance, are there special features of art that, when encountered, 
constitute an aesthetic experience? Such features might be harmony or balance, say, or 
unity or intensity in what is encountered and/or represented. Or, is it not special features 
of what is encountered, but rather a special focus by the receiver of the art. For example, 
one might encounter an object (say, a flower or a soup can or a sunset or a series of 
movements) and focus on the harmony, balance, etc. Closely related to this notion of 
special focus, the nature of the aesthetic experience might be on special attitudes or ways 
of approaching and receiving some object or phenomenon. This is sometimes noted by 
speaking of the difference between naked and nude. Here the emphasis is on selective 
attention (e.g., focusing on movement in a photograph or statue while ignoring the colors 
or physical materials) and maintaining an aesthetic “psychic distance.” (For example, the 
aesthetic experience of watching a play would be lessened and perhaps even unattainable 
for someone who too closely identified with the particular actors on stage rather than the 
characters being portrayed or by the producer of the play who only encountered the play 
in terms of its financial payback). In any case, the aspects of representation, and the 
relevant questions of what is being represented, how it is being represented, and why it is 
being represented, are all pertinent with respect to the audience of art, but in somewhat 
different ways than to the creator of art. It strikes me that understanding representation or 
reference in the context of art (that is, artistic or aesthetic reference) requires a 
comprehension and analysis of these three aspects (the what, how, and why). If so, then 
again, there might be good reason to inquire into all three with respect to linguistic 
reference. 
Finally, by critic-centered concerns, I mean issues that are especially related to 
artistic interpretation and criticism. These are, in one sense, also audience- or receiver-
centered issues, since they focus on the reception of art, not its creation. However, these 
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are somewhat different than the emphasis on the nature of aesthetic experience. 
Nonetheless, the three broad foci remain: what is interpreted (or critiqued), how it is 
interpreted (or critiqued), and why. These issues relate back to questions of artist intent as 
well as questions of form vs. context. For example, what, if anything, about the personal 
biography of an artist is relevant in interpreting and critiquing a work by that artist? 
Would an interpretation of a work of art be mistaken if the artist said that he intended the 
work to say X and it was interpreted by others to say Y or Z, or even to deny X? What 
would constitute a good interpretation and, even more, a correct interpretation? Some 
aestheticians have argued that the point of interpretation and criticism is to convince 
people (perhaps even the artist) of some facts about the art (that is, to get people to 
believe something). Others claim the point of interpretation and criticism is not to get 
people to believe something, but to get them to perceive something (in the art). 
Interpretation and criticism is a form of pointing (as in: Just look at the movement in this 
work, or: See how this phrase is juxtaposed with that phrase and how they are resolved 
later in the work). The point for me here is – as before – that there are, even in the context 
of interpretation and criticism, the questions of what, how, and why. 
Bottom line? There are interpretive, pragmatic, and axiological aspects that are, I 
believe, inherent and ineliminable in artistic representation and reference. Recognizing 
this, and acknowledging that these aspects apply to linguistic reference, as well, might be 
fruitful for philosophers of language to pursue in their analysis of linguistic reference. I 
have only touched in a glancing way some of the issues about representation and 
reference that energize and agitate philosophers of art. Nonetheless, I suggest that taking 
these issues and aspects seriously might be useful for philosophers of language. Picture 
that! 
 
 
 
(This paper was originally presented at the Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, in 
Pullman, WA, on May 1, 2010.) 
